Case Study on Twitter
Case Study on Twitter
The decentralized nature of Twitter is simultaneously its greatest strength and weakness: every citizen is able to participate, but consumers of its information have few methods of verifying facts. Bloggers require years to develop a reputation for excellent reporting, yet anyone with an Internet connection or cell phone can become part of the Twitter swarm of contributors. Like those using many other social networking tools, Twitter users’ views are not necessarily representative of a larger population, since tweeters tend to be wealthy, well-educated, and English-speaking.
This addendum to “What's Being Done On the Role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in Democracy Promotion?” will focus on the positive and negative aspects of using Twitter in protests. It focuses on so-called “Twitter protests” that took place in Greece, Moldova, and Iran, revealing Twitter’s usefulness for organizing, as well as on the riots in Xinjiang, which show its limitations in the face of government crackdowns.
The World Movement would like to thank its intern, Jennifer Newman, for her contributions to this section of What’s Being Done On…?
Greece
The first so-called “networked protest” took place in December 2008, when young Greeks protested after a 15-year-old boy was shot by a police officer. The protests gave vent to economic frustrations and concerns about government corruption. Twitter, Facebook, and other social networking tools were used not only to organize rallies, but also to garner support from the Greek diaspora and foreigners, who organized sympathetic demonstrations throughout Europe and the United States. The enormous flood of information from these online tools served to increase the visibility of what was largely a local issue, but it also confused outsiders who were unsure as to which tweeters were reliable and accurate.
Moldova
Protests in Moldova in April 2009 relied even more heavily on Twitter as an organizing tool during the media-dubbed “Twitter Revolution.” Over 10,000 young Moldovans used the tool to plan a protest against the reelection of members of the Communist Party to Parliament, who the protestors suspect won their seats as a result of electoral fraud. The largely leaderless demonstrators used Twitter to organize a march on government buildings, which unfortunately, resulted in protestors setting furniture on fire and throwing rocks at the Parliament building. The outside world had instant access via “tweets” to images and videos of youth clashing with police and smashing windows. The government ultimately recounted the ballots, which confirmed the election of members of the Communist party. However, in July, repeat elections were held and the Communist Party was unseated as the Parliamentary majority.
Iran
Protests in response to the June 2009 Iranian election have been touted as another “Twitter Revolution” by the media. The tool, however, was mostly used by tech savvy, well-educated Iranians to communicate with the outside world, and for the diaspora and foreigners to express solidarity with the opposition. Moreover, due to a crackdown on journalists in Iran, the foreign media were forced to use Twitter as a primary source of information, despite the impossibility of authentication. The 140-character limit ensured journalists a supply of concise sound bites, which increased foreign interest in the protests throughout the 24-hour news cycle.
Recognizing the influence of Twitter on the events in Iran, the U.S. State Department requested that Twitter delay scheduled technical maintenance to prevent interruption of its service. In response, the Iranian government blocked the Twitter Web site and other social networking tools, including Facebook and YouTube. It also stopped SMS services, and tracked Twitter users by IP address.
Xinjiang
Demonstrations by the Uighur population in western China in July 2009 are instructive concerning a main weakness of Twitter—vulnerability to government censorship. Twitter enabled Uighurs to share their stories and photos with the world, and it is no coincidence that the rallies and subsequent riots began in Urumqi—one of the most wired areas in the Xinjiang region. The Chinese government, which is arguably responsible for one of the most extensive Internet censoring campaigns in the world, quickly shut down large swaths of Internet and cell-phone coverage, as well as long-distance phone connections. The government succeeded in almost completely blocking the social networking tool, pushing Twitter to a peripheral, if not a totally nonexistent role, in the protests.
Information for this summary was drawn, in part, from the following sources:
Greece
Morozov, Evgeny. “The Alternative's alternative.” open Democracy. 29 December 2008. www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/the-alternatives-alternative.
Moldova
Barry, Ellen. “Protests in Moldova Explode, With Help of Twitter.” The New York Times. 7 April 2009. www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/world/europe/08moldova.html
Barry, Ellen. “Protests Wane in Moldova as Vote Recount Is Announced.” The New York Times. 10 April 2009. www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/world/europe/11moldova.html.
“Flash Mob Rule.” Transitions Online. 10 April 2009. www.tol.cz/look/TOL/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=316&NrSection=2&NrArticle=20502.
Iran
Cohen, Noam. “Twitter on the Barricades: Six Lessons Learned.” The New York Times. 20 June 2009. www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/weekinreview/21cohenweb.html.
Landler, Mark and Brian Stelter. “Washington Taps Into a Potent New Force in Diplomacy.” The New York Times. 16 June 2009. www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/world/middleeast/17media.html.
Palfrey, John, Bruce Etling and Robert Faris. “Reading Twitter in Tehran? Why the real revolution is on the streets – and offline.” The Washington Post. 21 June 2009. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/19/AR2009061901598.html.
Stelter, Brian. “Journalism Rules Are Bent in News Coverage From Iran.” The New York Times. 28 June 2009. www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/business/media/29coverage.html?_r=2.
Sullivan, Andrew. “The Revolution Will Be Twittered.” The Atlantic. 13 June 2009. http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/06/the-revolution-will-be-twittered-1.html.
Xinjiang
Olesen, Alexa. “Internet plays key role in China’s latest unrest.” The New Zealand Herald. 8 July 2009. www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10583159.
Fletcher, Owen and Dan Nystedt. “Internet, Twitter Blocked in China City After Ethnic Riot.” IDG News Service. 6 July 2009. www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/167884/internet_twitter_blocked_in_china_city_after_ethnic_riot.html.
Heacock, Rebekah. “China shuts down Internet in Xinjiang region after riots.” OpenNet Initiative. 6 July 2009. www.opennet.net/blog/2009/07/china-shuts-down-internet-xinjiang-region-after-riots.
Wines, Michael. “In Latest Upheaval, China Applies New Strategies to Control Flow of Information.” The New York Times. 7 July 2009. www.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/world/asia/08beijing.html?scp=1&sq=In%20Latest%20Upheaval,%20China%20Applies%20New%20Strategies%20to%20Control%20Flow%20of%20Information&st=cse.
