REGIONAL WORKSHOPS

• Leopaldo Amado – Guinea-Bissau
• Carine Kabasele Bapita – Democratic Republic of Congo
• Lucie Coulibaly – Côte d’Ivoire
• Margaret Dongo – Zimbabwe
• Ayesha Imam – Nigeria
• Durria Mansour Al Hussein – Sudan
• Ernest Mparo – Democratic Republic of Congo (Norway-based)
• Khabele Matlosa – Lesotho
• Ayo Obe – Nigeria
• Thierno Sow – Guinea
• Wanjala Yona – Uganda
• Dieudonne Zognong – Cameroon

• Support for incipient grassroots efforts to create local democracy in China should be enhanced.
• Democracy activists working in China should recognize the oppression of different nationalities, such as Tibetans and Uyghurs.
• It would be useful for democracy organizations to learn from Mongolia’s contribution to research on societies in transition.
• Future World Movement assemblies should include discussion specifically on North Korea.
• The increased involvement of Taiwanese organizations in pro-democracy efforts in the region should be more widely acknowledged.
• A forum should be organized on the impact of Chinese democratization or lack thereof on the region

• Pro-democracy efforts should go beyond electoral democracy and build substantive democratic institutions through devolution and decentralization.
• There is a need to recognize that the absence of democratic norms leads to internal conflicts, and that democracy can only be enhanced when states act as guarantors of social justice from a rights perspective.
• While recognizing the need to protect democracies from the scourge of terrorism, there is concern that many states are using the war against terrorism to depart from democratic norms and standards and are only helping those who seek to deviate from democracy.
• There is a need to highlight the plight of minorities and to give women a major share in democratic legislative institutions and other decision-making processes. The constitution of each country should be reviewed to address these needs.
• A forum should be created to resolve regional issues, such as water distribution, migration and work permits, and refugee movements. Although it is a governmental institution, the South Asian Regional Community (SARC) was considered as one framework for such a forum. Southeast Asia.
• Civil society organizations need to encourage Western governments and international donor agencies to implement human rights clauses and take other action to stem the grave human rights abuses in Southeast Asian countries, such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
• Like participants from South Asia, the Southeast Asia group was also concerned that ASEAN governments are using the war against terrorism as justification for undemocratic behavior, and participants from the sub-region should be encouraged to issue statements on the threats being faced by democracy and human rights activists.
• Some participants argued that democracy must go beyond being the preserve of local elites, and that this can be achieved only through a process of broader participation.
• Links between region-based and exile NGOs should be strengthened in totalitarian countries where democracy groups and independent NGOs are prohibited.
• The creation of an alternative regional cooperation platform that might be called the “Southeast Asia Democracy Forum” or the “People’s Assembly for Democracy” should be considered.
• A conference on closed societies in Southeast Asia should also be convened. Following the reports from the sub-regional groups, participants engaged in a wider discussion on the region. Among the points on which there was agreement are the following:
• There was consensus that in addition to the totalitarian states, including China, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam, some authoritarian states, such as Bhutan, the Maldives, and Singapore should be considered “closed societies.”
• There was also consensus that Asian participants should strengthen links and set up a network for advancing democracy in Asia. However, since no consensus was reached on what form this network should take, it was decided to launch a regional consultation whereby participants could circulate policy papers on their countries and elicit opinions on ways to create this network and address the challenges identified in the sub-regional discussions.
• The participants agreed to create an e-mail discussion list to facilitate the sharing of ideas and the policy papers.

• The media system in the region is mainly opinion journalism (or propaganda) rather than news reporting as it exists in the West; opposition journalism, for instance, takes the form of political propaganda rather than news reporting. Television is government controlled, and newspapers, which have small circulations and are not for profit (there is no “news industry”), are really just political party leaflets. Can journalists who work within this system change if the political environment changes? Can the media begin to report the truth after a regime changes and permits the media to publish freely?
• Concerning government coercion and violence, censorship is enforced in informal ways. Journalists try to report the truth as they see it, but currently the most serious impediments are those imposed through government repression. Journalists are human and are thus susceptible to bias and corruption as are other professionals.
• Guidelines for media monitoring developed by MEMO in Slovakia have been adopted by the OSCE for election monitoring, and can serve as a form of external leverage for improvement. The most important criteria are media pluralism and autonomy, and there are specific quantitative ways of measuring these factors. Media monitoring can be used not only for the purposes of methodology and advocacy, but also for educating journalists. There must be both internal and external pressure to bring about improvement; international solidarity among journalists is one way to achieve this. Of course, press freedom can be enhanced by the overall strengthening of democratic institutions.

• Support broadcasts from abroad to ensure pluralism. From within the NIS, one possibility is using Internet radio, even though it would reach only a small audience. From the outside, television and radio broadcasting should be sponsored so it can provide balanced reporting from abroad, without being susceptible to the same kinds of pressures on media working within the system. For instance, television broadcasting in Russian from Central Europe can play a very significant role since Russian television is under total state control throughout the NIS region.
• Concerning corruption and partiality among journalists within the NIS, ethical standards should be promoted by adopting codes of ethics and by holding journalists accountable to them (by rewarding professional journalism and condemning corrupt or biased journalism). From outside the region, training programs and ways of sharing experiences should be developed.
• Concerning the defense of journalists against repression within the NIS, unity among journalists should be fostered by forming a journalists’ union. In addition, legal assistance should be provided to journalists to reveal the political character of the cases against them as well as the procedural violations. From the outside, international pressure should be employed (for instance, from the OSCE and the Council of Europe, which should enforce the obligations of their member governments.
• Inter-regional cooperation should be supported so that experiences and skills from Central Europe might be used in the NIS region. Moreover, the publics and governments of Central European countries should become advocates in international forums of promoting accountability and change within the NIS.

• The countries in the region were described as “troubled democracies” that share a great deal of history and culture. Most of them are “post-Communist” and “post-Ottoman” states that are neither the “front-runners” toward democracy nor, obviously, established tyrannies. A number of countries in the region show some deeply-rooted democracy deficits that cause concern about the quality and sustainability of democracy. There have also been conflicts in Europe and in the post-Soviet area for years due to difficult and even hostile relations among neighbors and failures to manage ethnic and cultural diversity respectfully. In addition, many people in the Black Sea region countries have the sense that they are living “on the margins of Europe” and see a special connection between domestic reform and international agendas.
• It is important to define the agendas of think tanks and networks; to identify the “customers” and “final beneficiaries” of think tank work and the opportunities for exchange and the sharing of experiences; to address the problem of language and communication, both direct and indirect; and to establish the legitimacy, accountability, and credibility of think tanks and their networks.
• A common feature of the region is the relative weakness of other civil society institutions and the role that think tanks can play in improving political discourse. As a “classical US-UK import” to the region, think tanks have built on a huge pool of intellectual resources and have contributed to the hugely decentralized policy process by serving initially as a “shelter for retired politicians” and as “translators” between the government and foreign actors, and, later, between government and society. Gradually, through cooperation and competition, the diverse think tank community became the bearer of local policy knowledge and the agent of influence that helped convert ideas from the intellectual community into policies of practical governance. The role of think tanks and their networks is thus to contribute to research and analysis, in order to increase the capacity of political parties to draft legislation; to contribute to shaping, influencing, and informing public opinion on policy issues; to unite efforts of different groups and countries in promoting democratic values; and to serve as a link between civil society and the state by making citizens aware of what institutions do and by informing the government of the people’s opinions and preferences.

• The similarities among countries in the region suggest that when addressing a problem in a particular country the think tank community should look at the experiences of other countries that have addressed that problem. Setting examples and demonstrating possibilities for similar experiences is therefore important. Think tanks throughout the region can respond to the need for interaction and cooperation at the professional level by developing a framework for mutual learning, exchanging information, comparative research.
• Networks that exist independent of projects are at risk; therefore, there is a need for networks that look at specific projects with specific actors, customers, and purposes of influence. There is therefore room for issue-focused or functional networks within the region (for instance, on human rights, media, or elections) not just to facilitate the replication of experiences, but also to help avoid mistakes made by others. Learning from others’ experiences can also help to save funds, avoid delays and set-backs, and to maintain the speed of the transition.
• Networks can generate greater publicity and international support to strengthen the efforts of pro-democracy NGOs; they can increase the role and visibility of NGOs domestically and can provide support through petitions, letter-writing campaigns, and other means, thus serving as a “democracy solidarity network.” However, no kind of international cooperation can compensate for the lack of influence of think tanks within their own countries.
• There should be greater “quality control” of policy advice and analysis produced by think tanks.
• For any network, communication and information exchange is critical. It is therefore important to develop a network’s communications via a variety of vehicles, from Internet publications to e-mail discussion lists.

• The participants emphasized that in most of the countries in the region, regardless of the level of democracy, there is very little public demand for accountability and transparency. This is often connected to a lack of trust in elected representatives and democratic institutions.

• NGOs working in the field of accountability and transparency need to develop their professional capacity to explain to the public why their activities are taking place and why citizens should take an active role in pressing government for greater openness.
• NGOs should be provided with specific training in the area of public outreach.
• Where access to the mass media is limited, NGOs should promote openness by working through NGO networks that cultivate demand for openness within their particular constituencies.
• Civic education efforts are important for overcoming historical legacies of a lack of citizen engagement; these efforts should be especially encouraged in schools.
• One of the most important functions of NGOs working for accountability and transparency is to serve as a “bridge” between government and society. This can be accomplished in three ways:
• NGOs should help translate complex and technical government policy proposals into language that will raise citizens’ awareness of the issues at hand.
• NGOs should encourage parliamentarians and government officials to adopt simpler procedures when writing and implementing legislation.
• NGOs should not consider simple adoption of a law to be a final success; they should work continuously to ensure that implementation reflects the spirit of the laws. Finally, participants expressed concern about recent political developments in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Given the need to strike a balance between the fight for democracy in general and the work that must be done to increase understanding and awareness of accountability and transparency, greater NGO cooperation was emphasized.

• There is a general lack of interest in youth issues among democracy activists in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Although young people are the future leaders of the region, they are becoming more apathetic and disengaged from the democratic struggle.
• Several participants noted that rather than becoming more apathetic, young activists are becoming more radical.
• Many of the leading youth movements in the region have failed to survive transitions to democracy or have become ineffective “professional” structures.

• Young activists must be invited to participate in international networks and conferences, such as the assemblies of the World Movement.
• An international network of youth activists should be established and supported to increase solidarity among youth.
• Democracy-building organizations should put more focus on youth programs and they should be a priority in terms of investment.
• Youth programs should be run by and for young people, not by and for older activists.
• Youth programs should be fun, interesting, irreverent, stylish, and tailored to the interests of young people.
• Youth programs in Eurasia can benefit from earlier experiences and programs for young people in Central Europe. Support for cross-border youth programs should be a priority.

• The participants emphasized that while each of the papers under discussion focused on the political obstacles to improving democratic governance, the papers underestimated the role of socio-economic factors.
• Participants from different sectors of society expressed concern that many Latin Americans do not identify with democracy.

• There is a need to invigorate the democratic system in general and political parties in particular.
• The question of wide income inequality must be an important consideration in thinking about democracy promotion.
• There is a need to highlight the ethical components of Latin American democracy so that Latin American democracy is recognized as a community of values, and there must be greater efforts to increase social capital and include ethnic minorities in the democratic process.
• It is important to include the entire region, especially countries in the Caribbean, in thinking about democratization in the region.
• It is necessary to emphasize and integrate the “micro” elements of governance such as the political, economic, social, and cultural components. There is a need to incorporate democracy into the daily lives citizens.
• Greater solidarity should be developed with citizens in oppressive situations, such as in Cuba.

• Common challenges in the region
• How to assist democracy activists in post-conflict societies, with emphasis on Iraq, Palestine, and Afghanistan
• Peace processes in the region.

• Issues related to gender, children, youth, and poverty
• Issues related to state control of NGOs and weak or non-democratic political parties
• The role of culture and the need for education
• The role of the community.

• Women’s needs
• Human rights and the rights of prisoners
• Democracy awareness and education, including mobile democracy schools
• NGO capacity building and skills development
• Youth rights and programs
• Issues of social and political stability
• Education about elections
• Current use of the media;
• Training
• Minority rights and ethnic and religious tolerance.

• A Web site, including an online discussion forum;
• A weekly “Democracy Digest” featuring sections on “Issues” and “Information”; and
• Symposia, debates, and exchanges involving Europeans and North Americans who are interested in democracy issues.

• The initiative should not simply be a dialogue between the United States and the European Union, but should include new and aspiring members of the Euro-Atlantic community in Eastern Europe and the NIS.
• The initiative should focus not only on identifying common values, but also on identifying common projects and modes of cooperation.
• The project should not try to be overly ambitious or try to “reinvent the wheel”; it should not be about creating new structures where they already exist, but about creating a loose community of democrats working towards common goals.
• The initiative should be pro-active, not reactive or defensive. It should offer positive, workable solutions to the transatlantic problems of democracy promotion.
• The goal of the initiative should be to underscore the historic challenge faced by countries on both sides of the Atlantic in advocating the spread of democracy worldwide.